One step forward and two steps back to the proper appreciation of spatial science by Johnston, Ron et al.
                          Johnston, R., Harris, R. J., Jones, K., Manley, D. J., Sabel, C. E., & Wang,
W. W. (2014). One step forward and two steps back to the proper
appreciation of spatial science. Dialogues in Human Geography, 4(1), 59-69.
10.1177/2043820614526818
Link to published version (if available):
10.1177/2043820614526818
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Take down policy
Explore Bristol Research is a digital archive and the intention is that deposited content should not be
removed. However, if you believe that this version of the work breaches copyright law please contact
open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access Team will immediately investigate your claim, make an
initial judgement of the validity of the claim and, where appropriate, withdraw the item in question
from public view.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One Step Forward but Two Steps Back to the Proper 
Appreciation of Spatial Science 
 
This paper is an extended reply to critics and comments on our original paper that had to be 
shortened due to journal space requirements. 
The original paper is   
Ron Johnston, Richard Harris, Kelvyn Jones, David Manley, Clive E Sabel, and Wenfei Winnie Wang 
(2014) Mutual misunderstanding and avoidance, misrepresentations and disciplinary politics: spatial 
science and quantitative analysis in  (United Kingdom) geographical curricula  Dialogues in Human 
Geography 2014; 4:3-25 doi:10.1177/2043820614525706 
see:  http://dhg.sagepub.com/content/4/1/3.abstract.html?etoc 
The reply as published in its shortened form is: 
Ron Johnston, Richard Harris, Kelvyn Jones, David Manley, Clive E Sabel, and Wenfei Winnie Wang 
(2014) One step forward but two steps back to the proper appreciation of spatial science 
Dialogues in Human Geography 2014; 4:59-69 doi:10.1177/2043820614526818  
See  http://dhg.sagepub.com/content/4/1/59.abstract.html?etoc 
 
The full debate is to be found at 
Dialogues in Human Geography, March 2014; Vol. 4, No. 1 
http://dhg.sagepub.com/content/4/1?etoc  
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One Step Forward but Two Steps Back to the Proper 
Appreciation of Spatial Science 
 
Abstract 
Several of the commentaries on the original paper made valuable contributions to one of its 
goals – promoting discussion about the contents of quantitative methods curricula for human 
geography undergraduate and postgraduate courses. But the only commentary relevant to the 
other goal, promoting a fuller understanding of contemporary spatial science across the entire 
discipline, was disappointing, raising new critical issues – regarding, for example, the use of 
place and of data collected from individuals in spatial scientific studies. These are responded 
to in this reply to the commentaries. 
 
Keywords 
Spatial science, quantitative human geography, place, data, curricula 
 
The goal of our initial contribution to this dialogue (Johnston et al., 2014) was to consolidate 
the place of ‘spatial science’ within contemporary human geography (with particular 
reference to the UK), not by pressing its claims against other approaches we believe should 
be marginalised or eliminated (we don’t think there are any), but rather by ensuring that all 
practitioners and students engage with its contributions, actual and potential, to the 
discipline’s raison d’être. The paper addressed two main issues: the first was to overcome the 
mis-understandings and (quite possibly unintended) mis-representations of ‘spatial science’ 
that are too common in the contemporary literature, especially introductory textbooks; the 
second was to initiate debates about what those parts of a curriculum advancing quantitative 
understanding might contain, given major changes in the volume and nature of data now 
available.  
 
Our reaction to the solicited commentaries is that we have been much more successful in the 
latter than the former task: several make important contributions to the discussion on what 
should be taught within the undergraduate and postgraduate curricula, how, and why. 
However, we were disappointed that none indicated we had made any headway in convincing 
those who are not ‘spatial scientists’ that contemporary work in this area should be 
recognised as an integral part of geography’s task of understanding the contemporary world – 
not simply as a transferable skill associated with numeracy and employment (although that is 
important too) but as a rich area of contemporary research that sits at the very heart of the 
discipline and its substantive interests. Hence much of this response seeks to advance that 
purpose yet again. 
 
Two Steps Back! What is spatial science, what does it do, and why is it 
important? 
 
Spatial science is our (and others’) shorthand description for a wide range of work 
characterised by the use of numerical data and statistical analysis that might also be described 
as quantitative human geography. We are aware that other authors might use the same term to 
describe a particular epoch in geography’s history, referring to the period of the so-called 
‘theoretical and quantitative revolutions’ of the 1950s-1960s. Although we could debate the 
detail of that period, our main concern is that it is often presented as history – something that 
has been and gone, or perhaps lingers at the margins of the discipline (the ghost of positivism 
past?). The main concern of our paper was to argue that this notion of past tense is 
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inappropriate, as is the idea that what remains of spatial science today has not evolved either 
in practice or in its philosophical underpinnings from what took place some decades ago. 
Nobody, we hope, would suggest that cultural geography has not changed since Carl Sauer, 
yet spatial science seems to us too frequently mis-interpreted, notably by those writing 
textbooks for introductory undergraduate courses who present it as not having evolved.
1
 
 
David O’Sullivan wonders if we haven’t over-reacted to a few such texts, being oversensitive 
and seeing disrespect where none is intended. We can assure him that some ‘spatial 
scientists’ at least have experienced such disrespect, including colleagues briefing against 
some of us to our own students (examples were quoted in our footnotes). We are also well 
aware of widespread lack of appreciation of what we do (in part reflecting under- and post-
graduate course offerings in many places over the last two decades), of unwillingness to 
address those lacunae, and of a desire among some at least of our peers to place spatial 
science on the disciplinary margins, if not relegated to its past.
2
 Trevor Barnes believes that 
we over-state the difference between spatial science then (i.e. pre-1980) and now, but 
generalises from a sample of one; we contend that Abler, Adams and Gould, Golledge, 
Haggett, Harvey (pre-1973), King, Wilson and others were much more influential in setting 
spatial science’s trajectory than Bill Warntz and the macro-geographers/social physicists.3  
 
We admit, however, that what we identify as a lack of appreciation may also be a product of a 
lack of understanding. It has been suggested, for example, that quantitative geographers have 
been slow to engage in some of the philosophical debates concerning constructions of 
knowledge within human geography. Although not entirely valid (witness some of the 
debates around GIS and its purposes in the 1990s: for example, Pickles, 1995, and Curry, 
1998), there is, perhaps, truth in an argument that spatial scientists have been slow to 
showcase the importance of what they do to the discipline, and to new generations of scholars 
and students. There is a responsibility on our part to be more involved in the (co-)production 
of such texts in the future.  
 
Spatial science: what it was and what it is 
 
The main response to the first part of our paper, however, is Cresswell’s; when writing our 
original paper his book was the most recent exemplar of the problems we identified as too 
common in contemporary texts. It is important to restate at this point that on the whole we 
found much to admire in his book. Moreover, and lest it be seen that we are overly 
preoccupied by the writings of one author, we should emphasise that his mis-representations 
of spatial science as largely mired in the 1960s are not unique. Indeed, a more recent text – 
the third edition of a best-seller – makes exactly the same claims regarding spatial science’s 
marginality (Cloke, Crang and Goodwin, 2014, xxii-xxiii and 940), presenting it as not 
having changed from: 
                                                          
1
 The focus is on introductory textbooks since these are the only public arena in which geographers of one 
persuasion feel it necessary to address the work of those of another. In their own research, especially given the 
plethora of specialist journals, they can readily ignore it. 
2
 One of us (Johnston 1984, 1985, 1997) has long argued that the form that spatial science took in its early 
decades was too constrained – O’Sullivan noted only one of those items! 
3
 Incidentally, one of the pioneers of that type of work – George Zipf – did promote a ‘principle of least effort’, 
surely a positivistic approach, and the concept of population potential is under-pinned by the gravity model, 
which assumes the sort of rational behaviour Barnes claims Warntz did not assume: and although Stewart and 
Warntz may not have resolved the computational issues until 1958, Chauncy Harris (1954) had done so in a too-
forgotten earlier pioneering paper. 
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… an approach to Human Geography that became influential in the 1960s by arguing 
that geographers should be concerned with formulating and testing theories of spatial 
organisation, interaction and distribution. The theories were often expressed in the 
forms of models – of, for instance, land use, settlement hierarchy, industrial location 
and city sizes. If validated, these theories were then accorded the status of individual 
laws. Through this manoeuvre, the advocates of spatial science claimed that Human 
Geography had been shifted from an essentially descriptive enterprise concerned with 
the study of regional differences to a predictive and explanatory science. Critics claim 
that in its attempts to formulate universally applicable laws, spatial science ignored 
the social and economic context within which its spatial variables were located. 
Cloke et al.’s book has three goals (p.xv): to map out ‘the big, foundational ideas that have 
shaped the discipline past and present’; to explore ‘key research themes [now] being pursued 
in Human Geography’s various sub-disciplines’; and to identify ‘some of the current research 
foci that are shaping the horizons of the subject’. Spatial science certainly plays no part in the 
second and third of those – in the editors’ view it is not contributing to the discipline’s key 
research themes and so students need not be introduced to its work – and appears only as part 
of the past in the first (and then it is unclear whether they classify it as a ‘big, foundational 
idea’ – in contrast to Cox, 2014, who sees it as fundamental).4 A book written for ‘students 
new to university degree courses’ basically ignores contemporary spatial science and further 
justifies our goal as set out in the introduction above. Its editors claim that human 
geographers ‘argue both that human life is shaped by “where it happens” and that “where it 
happens” is socially shaped’ (p.xvii) – which is exactly what much contemporary spatial 
science demonstrates. Alongside Cresswell, however, they see quantitative work as 
descriptive only (p.xxii: Little – 2014, 26 – also implies that quantitative analysis can 
describe but not explain and equates spatial science with ‘a kind of spatial determinism in 
which spatial difference caused social inequality’ – p. 25, her emphasis – and a ‘belief that 
space was passive’)! Explanation and causation are very much on the contemporary agenda 
across quantitative social science and there is considerable interest and progress in how we 
can do this with observational and not experimental data – witness the 1600+ pages of Davis 
(2014) and also Gangl (2010).
5
 
 
Cloke et al. (2014) is not entirely lacking reference to more recent work in spatial science – 
as in: Kitchin’s careful discussion of the difference between explanation and understanding, 
which clearly identifies the methodological and philosophical distinctions between 
quantitative and qualitative work but without (understandably) any detailed illustrations of 
the types of analysis conducted in contemporary spatial science; and Conradson’s (2014) 
brief mention, but without exemplars, of the epidemiological tradition in the geography of 
health and well-being. There is also a chapter on GIS (though not GI Science): it asserts that 
GIS facilitates data collection, analysis and modelling, but provides no examples of the latter 
two (Haklay, 2014); instead, it seems more concerned to advance engagement between GIS 
                                                          
4
 Gilbert (2014, 103-104) compares the Cloke et al. (2014) book with Haggett’s (1972ff) Geography: a Modern 
Synthesis and remarks that ‘there is little direct application in this volume [i.e. the former] of the approaches that 
Haggett heralded’, with the clear implication to student-readers that those approaches – ‘formulating and testing 
theories of spatial organization’ (Christaller and von Thünen once again!) – are no longer part of human 
geography. Quoting the work of Dorling, Gilbert accepts the ‘power of numbers and maps as an important 
element of a critical social science’ but dismisses the modelling work done at the Centre for Advanced Spatial 
Analysis (CASA: http://www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/casa) and elsewhere, which he identifies as positivism (though 
we doubt that the researchers there do: see Batty, 2013) 
5
 Or http://csm.lshtm.ac.uk/themes/causal-inference/ (accessed 27 January 2014). 
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and ‘critical human geography’ than with spatial science.6  Nowhere in a book of over 900 
pages, however, is the full range of spatial science’s powerful contemporary arsenal engaged 
with when introducing the diversity of contemporary human geography and there are no 
illustrations of what can be achieved through rigorous quantitative analysis of data. There is 
an acceptance that students should have some introductory training in numerical methods but 
no willingness to address why. The risk is that books like Cresswell’s and Cloke et al.’s – 
plus others and, perhaps, many lectures, seminars and tutorials – end-up normalising the 
discipline (Luke, 1999: see also Klein, 1993; Amariglio et al. 1993; and Lenoir, 1993) 
according to their conceptions of what it should and should not contain rather than presenting 
introductory students with a broad conspectus of its diversity of practices and letting them 
decide. 
 
Another recent book poses the same set of issues. In a generally very fine ‘pocket dictionary’, 
Castree, Kitchin and Rogers (2013, 486) give two definitions of spatial science. The first – 
‘An approach to human geography centred on the analysis of spatial patterns and processes 
through quantitative methods, with the ultimate aim of establishing spatial laws’ – is very 
similar to those of Cresswell and Cloke et al., especially with regard to laws, and the 
subsequent discussion clearly identifies such work as concentrated in the 1950s-1970s. The 
second definition – ‘A collective term for GIS, cartography, remote sensing, 
photogrammetry, surveying, geodesy, and related disciplines concerned with scientific spatial 
analysis, sometimes also termed “spatial sciences” –  which they suggest is ‘often used to 
imply a set of academic and technical interests separate from but also complementary to 
geography’. Their definition of locational analysis is synonymous with that for spatial science 
(p.291) and spatial analysis is defined as (pp.480-1) ‘The mapping and analysis of spatial 
properties and patterns’, which would appear to incorporate much of what we have included 
as part of contemporary spatial science here and in our original paper, but the brief definition 
concludes that ‘With the development of GIS, spatial analysis has become a mainstream 
policy tool for making sense of spatial data and for aiding companies to plan their activities’ 
– which is much narrower than our definition of spatial science. They do, however, note that 
‘While quantitative geography is not as dominant as it once was, it is still a potent and vital 
part of the discipline’ (p.406) – exactly our point: so does Cox (2014, pp.53, 154-158, and 
255), whose personal interpretation of changes in human geography over the preceding 50 
years very much regrets the ‘marginalization of quantitative methods in human geography’ 
(p.255).
7
 
 
What we in this and our preceding paper – and following Cresswell’s (2013) own usage of 
the term, to which we were responding– call spatial science may therefore be associated by 
some with pre-1980s practices, whereas more contemporary work, because it distances itself 
from logical positivism, is simply embraced by the collective title of quantitative geography. 
However, Cresswell’s comments in his contribution to this dialogue suggest that he does not 
make this distinction – nor, we believe, do Cloke et al., 2014, and others – and spatial science 
to them not only incorporates the contemporary work but associates it with the logical 
positivist search for laws of spatial patterns and behaviour rather than – as we stressed in the 
                                                          
6
 Haklay’s (2014) illustrations of the utility of GIS refer only to business applications with no reference to their 
analytic utility. 
7
 Cox (2014, 156: our emphasis) is also explicit, unlike the textbook writers cited here, that ‘Quantitative 
geography was positivist’ but ‘could do [we would say has done] more than identify “descriptive ‘representative 
generalizations, lacking in explanatory penetration”. Rather, some spatial-quantitative work has been [and still 
is] concerned with uncovering mechanisms of the sort that Sayer believes are only accessible through “intensive 
methods”’ (p.138: his emphasis: the reference to Sayer is Sayer, 1992). 
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paper which initiated this dialogue – the identification and analysis of spatial variations and 
the search for explanatory accounts in  the realist not the positivist tradition.
8
 Hence this 
response to Cresswell’s commentary, in which he extends his critique of such work.9 
 
Cresswell believes that he was relatively kind to and positive about spatial science in his 
book (Cresswell, 2013) – that is probably true yet the problem (as we have emphasised) is 
one of writing the past whilst not fully appreciating the present. He may have found some 
spatial science work ‘Inspirational and compelling’, may believe that it has ‘the capacity to 
influence the world for the better in ways that few other approaches can’, and may very well 
be right that one of the reasons for spatial science’s unpopularity is that too few teachers of 
quantitative methods are able to ‘turn students on’ (hence our other goal here) – or even some 
of their own departmental colleagues. But it is very difficult to equate his statements 
regarding spatial science’s ‘capacity to influence the world for the better’ with the 
representations in his book (which we cited in our original paper – p. ???): how can analyses 
which assume ‘a particular kind of imaginary person’ and start with something ‘that is not 
true’ contribute to improving the world or convince students that this is an area of scholarship 
worth exploring? 
 
Place in spatial science 
 
…place – especially as manifested in neighbourhoods – is a fundamental context that 
has widespread effects on crime, perceptions of order and disorder, well-being and 
much more, including the social organization of the contemporary metropolis 
(Sampson, 2013, 1) 
 
Numerous writers suggest that geography’s key concepts are ‘space, place and environment’ 
(Johnston and Sidaway, 2014) and it was in this context that we indicated that spatial 
scientists today pay much more attention to place than to space. Place, as we and Cresswell 
(2014) appreciate, has many meanings and quasi-synonyms, but his comment that ‘Place is 
not the same as “local variation”’ and that our usage appears ‘at best, a shallow conception of 
place that really has to be experienced experientially and from inside’ seems not only to 
privilege a particular definition but also to avoid addressing our core argument that, to quote 
Cloke at al. again, ‘human life is shaped by “where it happens” and … “where it happens” is 
socially shaped’ – i.e. in places (or locales, or localities, or territories, or milieux, or…). 
Cresswell claims that he cannot tell from our examples ‘how place is present in spatial 
science – or even that it should be’: extremely rigorous quantitative work has shown, for 
example, that the peer groups young people are brought up among (i.e. those who share their 
places at a particular scale) can influence their academic performance (Goux and Maurin, 
2007).
10
 
                                                          
8
 This does not mean that we do not believe that the subject matter of the spatial sciences does not 
include regular patterns – which in some cases might be regular spatial patterns – but we do not argue 
that these regularities explain themselves. Nor do we believe– as was claimed in many of the early 
criticisms of positivist spatial science – that public policy should reproduce the status quo transient 
regularities, nor equate explanation with prediction. We are scientific and rigorous in our analyses but 
do not accept the tenets of logical positivism; see Jones (2010) and Johnston (1986). 
9
 We are not alone in seeking to move forward from the type of spatial science practices critiqued by Cresswell: 
see, for example, Baudains et al., (2013), Cook et al., (2011), Elwood (2006) and Kwan (2002) – some of which 
are breaking down the barriers between  spatial science and other human geographical practices. 
10
 Alternatively, see Syed’s (2011, 3-7) discussion of the influence of spatial clustering on the development of a 
group of highly successful sportspersons, and his conclusion that if his parents had bought the house next door 
to the one that they did, then he would never have become a champion table-tennis player. 
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More generally, Cresswell’s view that the ‘contemporary focus in spatial science on local 
variability sounds like a numerical version of regional geography’ further illustrates his 
misinterpretation of what he terms a wider ‘culture of numbers’. Regional geography as 
practised in the UK up to the 1970s suffers from a poor reputation but was not all bad, 
although much of it – as Peter Gould (1979) so gloriously showed – was banal and boring.11 
Nevertheless at its best – which includes many of the introductory courses and texts for US 
undergraduates who have no prior experience of the discipline – it ensured that students knew 
the basic lineaments of the wider world and gave them some appreciation of ‘place’ as 
Cresswell defines it (can one understand the world unless one can first describe it?). He 
believes that spatial scientists’ deployment of place – as we present it – is simply a 
description of ‘what things gather where’. It is much more than that, however, because its 
analyses show that which people gather, and in many cases interact, where can influence 
what things happen there and may be transmitted elsewhere (near or far), of which there is no 
better illustration than the decades of meticulous quantitative research in the epidemiological 
tradition by Cliff, Haggett and Smallman-Raynor (e.g. Cliff et al., 2000). Place to spatial 
scientists is a context in which things happen, because the place is constituted by people who 
interact there, and a recent overview of American research in this area (such as the extensive 
programme led by Sampson, 2012) has concluded not only that ‘the American system of 
stratification is organized, in part, along spatial lines’ but also that the spatial dimension of 
American inequality plays an important role in the maintenance and reproduction of 
inequality across multiple dimensions’ (Sharkey and Faber, 2014). In a world where 
inequalities are increasing (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Dorling, 2010) it seems perverse not 
to focus on the role of places as contexts in which those inequalities are being reproduced and 
exacerbated as the examples quoted here and in the concluding section clearly illustrate. 
 
Counting the individual 
 
One major change in the nature of spatial science in particular and social science more 
generally in recent decades has been its increasing use – and collection – of data at the 
individual rather than the aggregate scale, thus avoiding the ecological and other fallacies that 
so many earlier studies encountered, as well as the modifiable areal unit problem.
12
 Cresswell 
is ‘far from sure that I want to celebrate the entry of the individual into the domain of 
calculability’, because of issues of privacy and surveillance as well as ‘a more existential set 
of issues about the reduction of human subjectivity’. He asks ‘Do we want individuals to be 
quantified in this way? Do we want to encourage it by using the data?’. Our answer is a 
resounding yes – we do want students to be savvy users of useful data that, yes, may well be 
the product of capitalist or ‘surveillance’ societies but can also be used to inform, critique, 
and to reveal the shortcomings and social disparities within those societies. Does that mean 
we are unwitting co-producers of a society driven by cold quantitative and economic logics? 
Perhaps so. But so also are those who are unwilling to turn the numbers against themselves 
and use them to engage in social and other public policy relevant critique. We fully recognise 
the problems of privacy and confidentiality, and believe that students should be trained to do 
so too – issues that Elvin Wyly addresses fully in his commentary – and ensure that our 
collection and analysis of data compromise neither, but we firmly believe that without such 
data many important issues could not be fully addressed and compelling problems would 
remain unresolved. This is clearly illustrated in much spatial science research which 
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 To the extent that some of its practitioners subjected it to substantial criticism – see Freeman (1961, 141). 
12
 Which government might have been formed after the 2010 and 2015 general elections is a superb illustration 
of the relevance of this problem (Johnston et al., 2013). 
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indicates, for example, that without individual data it is impossible to elucidate the relative 
importance of genetic and environmental factors (let alone their interactions) on disease 
causation (Sabel et al., 2009) and appreciate the mortality impacts of environmental events 
(Pearson et al., 2013).
13
 To illustrate the problems that can arise when groups are used to 
make inferences because individual data are not available consider the case of gender bias in 
admissions to the University of California, Berkeley (Bickel et al, 1975). Overall, men 
applying were considerably more likely than women to be admitted but when individual data 
were examined by department there was no evidence of bias – because males tended to apply 
to less-competitive departments. Students need to be fully aware of this paradox and its 
geographical equivalent, the ecology fallacy, in making inferences with aggregate data. 
 
We have never claimed that the approaches we promote ‘even begin to approach our 
subjectivity’, nor would we argue that research in cultural geography focusing on subjectivity 
(whose ‘data’ must presumably be collected from individuals?) should not occupy a 
prominent place within our discipline. We simply contend that there is more to studying and 
trying to change the world than subjectivity. 
 
We live in a capitalist society in which the state is necessarily important (the Free Economy 
and Strong State so brilliantly described by Andrew Gamble, 1988), and in which more and 
more Big Data are being ‘pumped out by corporations, governments and the media’. We 
agree with Cresswell that students should ‘know enough to question the stream of numbers’ 
but disagree with his wish that they should not be ‘part of the making of a comprehensively 
calculable world’. They are going to be, whether he, we and they like it or not and we see it 
as necessary that they are prepared to be citizens of such a world (however undesirable we 
might think that is idealistically). Yes, those data are involved in the ‘production of profit and 
the manipulation of populations’ so our teaching should ensure that students are aware of 
that, which means much more than ensuring that they ‘know what correlation means (even 
just to know that it is still not causation)’. Our argument is represented by him as ‘Big 
businesses, governments and an assortment of ill-intentioned people know about numbers and 
use them therefore we (well-intentioned) people must do so too’. Yes, but that does not make 
us the lackeys of corporate capitalism and governments; we are social scientists ensuring that 
students become citizens who can evaluate how those (often well-intentioned) people collect 
and use data as well as ensuring that, as far as possible, they are used for the greatest good of 
the greatest number.
14
 As Thompson (2010, 381) expressed it when making the case for 
retaining a decennial census in Canada, high quality data are needed not only to inform 
decision-making but also ‘to allow the society to question and judge whether or not the 
government is acting in its best interests’. 
 
Nevertheless, we clearly share Cresswell’s concerns – more extensively expounded by Wyly 
– about the intrusiveness of much Big Data production, notably by corporations. There is 
however a difference between data obtained through covert surveillance and that given either 
freely – because you use a credit card or a store loyalty card, or leave your mobile phone on 
permanently – or as part of one’s civic duty, as with data collected by a democratically-
accountable government in order to pursue its policies (as with censuses: see Hannah, 2010, 
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 Incidentally, one of the quantitative papers that Cresswell (2013, 100) cites favourably was entirely based on 
individual-level data. 
14
 Cresswell says that throughout our paper there are references to ‘the use of quantitative methods in 
government and business’. We don’t apologise for that, we live in the world where that is the case – though 
interestingly unless various search engines have let us down the word ‘business’ did not appear even once in our 
original paper! 
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about citizen opposition to such data collections and particular forms of their use). The UK 
government, through its open data initiatives, is increasingly making such data available for 
public use in situations where there is no conflict with individual and group confidentiality 
and privacy, thereby enabling both critical analysis and well-founded contributions to policy 
development.
15
 Exeter et al. (2014) have recognised the potential problems with such use and 
release of individual-level, geocoded data with regard to confidentiality and the absence of 
consent; a balance has to be reached between the benefits to be gained and the possible 
misuses that might be facilitated if geoprivacy is not ensured. They argue strongly that 
without the properly-regulated release of expensively-collected individual-level data, 
advances in the understanding of, and responses to, morbidity and mortality patterns will be 
significantly impeded. 
 
We too do not favour a society in which, as Wyly expresses it, ‘Human trust is under siege, 
replaced by an expanding universe of surveillance’. But we believe – in common with all but 
the most extreme market-libertarians – that a civilised society needs some form of welfare 
state to tackle the five ‘Giant Evils’ identified by Beveridge – Want, Disease, Ignorance, 
Squalor, and Idleness (Timmins, 1995). Although policies designed to tackle each of those 
five are ultimately aimed at individuals many are delivered to them within collectivities – as 
with schools and hospitals – and the data on which many policies to determine what should 
be delivered, to whom, and where are necessarily for population aggregates, not individuals. 
Analyses conducted by academic social scientists and those in the public sector trained in 
their methods – using place as context, whether in studies of unemployment, morbidity and 
mortality, poverty or a wide range other topics – are fundamental to appreciation of where the 
problems that the welfare state exists to solve are concentrated and thus the where of its 
policy directions (Bastow et al. 2014; Denicolo, 2013).  
 
There is, however, one element of the ‘domain of calculability’ not addressed by Cresswell 
that requires caution. Counting and, especially, the reporting of what we have counted 
frequently involves categorisation of individuals, and in so doing structures society in ways 
that then become part of how it is represented and reproduced. The earliest censuses did this, 
for example, by not only counting how many individuals there were in a place but also what 
categories – such as occupational classes – they were members of (Levitan, 2011). Some of 
those categories are straightforward and (relatively) uncontestable, such as age and sex, but 
many others are highly contested, such as the much-debated ethnicity categories deployed by 
the UK’s Office of National Statistics (Berthoud, 1998; Aspinall, 2007). This involves what 
has been termed the ‘mutual construction of statistics and society’ (Sᴂtnan et al, 2011), with 
much of that construction undertaken (especially by social scientists) by and for the state to 
promote its governance objectives – and, some would argue, the exercise of power by those 
controlling the state bureaucracies (see the essays by Desrosières, 2011, and Kullenberg, 
2011).
16
 Those categorisations can be arranged along an objective-subjective scale: as they 
approach the latter, so they need to be treated with more caution because of the difficulty of 
measuring many concepts – as with the ‘happiness index’ invented for the UK Prime Minister 
in 2011.
17
 Any curriculum focusing on quantitative spatial science must ensure student 
awareness of the social construction of many of the categories that are analysed and the role 
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 See http://data.gov.uk/ – accessed 7 January 2014. 
16
 The corporate sector is also involved in such structuring: the socio-economic categorisations developed with 
geodemographic classifications of people-in-places, for example, are now major marketing tools (Longley and 
Clarke, 1995; Harris et al, 2005). 
17
 See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/user-guidance/well-being/index.html (accessed 15 January 
2014). 
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of such analysis in how socio-spatial structures are represented. But they must also become 
aware that measurement and categorization is not a simple and straightforward interpretive 
act and subjectivity brings its own problems. Thus Oakley (1990, 177), in her polemic 
‘Who’s afraid of the randomized control trial’, argues that ‘random numbers have the edge 
over human intuition because human beings are not always right in the judgements they 
make’. Indeed she claims that quantitative experimental methods are a key part of 
emancipatory social science lest the ideology of researchers and practitioners is imposed on 
those being researched and the status quo is thereby maintained.   
 
One (Good) Step Forward: curriculum design for spatial science 
 
We are very grateful for the two commentaries that directly address the second component of 
our original paper – what should be included in a spatial science curriculum spanning (UK) 
under- and postgraduate degree courses – and also to Elvin Wyly’s wider appreciation of the 
nature of ‘Big Data’. 
 
David O’Sullivan introduces two important correctives to our original paper. We accept that 
we underplayed the role of geometry within the evolving sub-discipline. This was something 
we debated when drafting the paper: our main concern was to stress that the emphasis on the 
geometry of spatial order that characterised early spatial science was no longer a major 
consideration, but in doing so we ignored much important work – such as that of Batty (2013) 
and his colleagues at University College London’s Centre for Applied Spatial Analysis – that 
explores the spatial structuring of contemporary cities without reference to the homo 
economicus distance- and cost-minimisation assumptions of earlier modelling,
18
 as well as 
overlooking the geometric underpinnings of much cartographic analysis. Similarly, we had 
no intention of side-lining GIS/GISc, widely used in much quantitative analysis of spatial 
distributions: our position on these is that – as with remote sensing several decades ago – 
what was for a time at the cutting-edge of spatial scientific work has now become 
mainstream. GIS is at the core of any viable spatial science curriculum, including the growing 
importance of visualisation as a key tool, whilst research at the frontier of software and 
hardware development (i.e. GISc) is concentrated in a few centres. O’Sullivan’s comments 
have enabled us to emphasise these positions, which may have been lost in our initial 
arguments. 
 
Chris Brunsdon’s contribution takes our arguments forward in a number of important ways, 
and we were particularly attracted to his thoughts regarding ‘Data journalism’. Some 
journalists are already well-trained in the quantitative arts. As Rogers (2013, 60) reports: 
The Wikileaks releases on Afghanistan, Iraq and the US embassy cables; the MPs’ 
expenses scandal; the global recession; even the swine flu pandemic: reporting on all 
of these was arguably only possible because of, and was irrevocably changed by, the 
existence of reporters who are not afraid of maths, know how to use a spreadsheet, 
work with the web visualisation tools and – crucially – know what questions to ask. 
The message needs to go beyond as well as through student communities – just as 
geographers did in earlier decades with regard to graphicacy via maps. Most of Brunsdon’s 
points relate to the emergence of a ‘Big Data paradigm’ and its implications for social 
scientific (i.e. reproducible) research, however. Those data are not collected either by the 
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 Although note that in a recent textbook Alan Wilson (2000) has a chapter on ‘classical models’ that includes 
von Thünen, Weber, Christaller, Lösch, Burgess, Hoyt, and Zipf, selected as ‘classics’ because he believes that 
‘they are discussed in most geography textbooks’ and ‘cover the main geographical problems for which theory 
is in principle required’ (p.50) 
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analysts themselves or by others who have used a ‘scientific’ research design (such as census 
and official statistics authorities); conventional measures of statistical significance have little 
relevance with such large-N ‘pseudo-samples’.19 All of these issues need to be taken into 
account when designing courses that will prepare students for the Big Data world. As 
illustrated by the changing nature of quantitative methods textbooks over the five decades 
since the first published by a geographer (Gregory, 1963), the nature of the data students are 
presented with and/or collect calls for approaches that were unthinkable then, when samples 
were very small and computers very slow (if you even used one!). 
 
Wyly takes the discussion of Big Data even further (as does the collection of brief papers in 
this journal convened by Graham and Shelton – 2013 – which only appeared after submission 
and acceptance of our original paper), debating whether as geographical scholars writing for 
an audience of scholarly geographers we really control the content of the curriculum, and 
whether any control that we have retained is under threat. Although we accept many of the 
concerns regarding surveillance (Graham and Wood, 2003) and the ways in which people – 
not least elected politicians – may/will deploy Big Data in an empiricist framework to 
provide evidence sustaining their positions, we are not as pessimistic as Wyly. He believes 
that we (we assume he means the UK) have an ‘educational system in which the audit culture 
is quickly destroying the conditions of possibility for uncommodified free thought and 
independent scholarly knowledge production’.  We remain unconvinced by that argument. 
The UK’s audit culture has been expanding rapidly since the first Research Assessment 
Exercise in 1985 and yet during the ensuing 25 years the sort of geography that Wyly 
believes will be repressed – ‘a truly human geography – geography as understood, lived, 
performed, and learned by humans’ – has blossomed, as exemplified by the amount of space 
given to approaches other than spatial science in the textbooks by Cresswell, Cloke et al. and 
others discussed here. And there is little evidence that such blossoming – which we welcome, 
so long as it doesn’t crowd out other viable approaches through mutual mis-representations 
and ignorance – has only occurred because of some culture of resistance by geographers. 
Quite the contrary. Fears of a ‘thought police’ and a technocratic takeover of geography 
within British academia are much overblown. That does not, of course, mean that we 
shouldn’t be eternally vigilant and ensure that students are aware of the many potential 
pitfalls of the Big Data paradigm and the possibility of the emphasis shifting from ‘evidence-
based policy’ to ‘policy-driven evidence manufacturing’. Geography flourishes as a broad-
based discipline, and we have no intention of challenging that – let alone seeing it under 
challenge from ‘outside authorities’. 
 
Why does it matter; why must this dialogue be continued? 
 
This is a time when the Mayor of London – a humanities graduate – does not understand that 
in a normalised distribution with 100 as its mean and a standard deviation of 15, 16 per cent 
of the respective population will always score below 85, that 2 per cent will always be above 
130,
20
 that IQ tests have to be re-calibrated every generation due to rising intelligence as 
measured in that way (the Flynn effect: Flynn, 2012), and that careful analysis of longitudinal 
data is needed to refute the IQ-income generation link! It is also the time when the head of 
the UK’s school standards body (OFSTED) stated that all school students should obtain 
above average grades in English and the country’s Secretary of State for Education implied 
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 Those designs can be ‘replicated’ with some big data sets, however, as with the weighting that is undertaken 
by opinion pollsters. 
20
 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/london-mayor-election/mayor-of-london/10480321/Boris-
Johnsons-speech-at-the-Margaret-Thatcher-lecture-in-full.html (accessed 3 January 2014). 
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that all schools should strive to be good – and that this meant that their students performed 
above the average!
21
 This is a time when the work of two Harvard economics professors is 
used to justify a global austerity package based on a relationship between debt and growth 
spuriously created by an Excel-spreadsheet error and inverting the casual flow (Bell et al., 
2014).  This is a  time when the UK’s Home Secretary (trained in geography at the University 
of Oxford), when shaping an immigration bill, declared that feelings matter more than fact,
22
 
and whose department replied to an EU request for the evidence about costs for ‘health 
tourists’ that ‘We consider that these questions place too much emphasis on quantitative 
evidence’.23  This is a time when PISA evidence on international variations in school 
students’ performance derived from standardised tests in reading, maths and science is being 
mis-used to restructure schools and the curriculum.
24
 This is a time when another Cabinet 
Minister in charge of reconstructing significant components of that country’s welfare state 
(who appears to have dissembled about his post-18 education
25
) rejects evidence-based policy 
because he believes that what he is doing is right and good.
26
  
  
This is a time when a mother wrongly convicted in the UK of murdering her children – and 
subsequently, after eventually being released on appeal, died of alcohol poisoning – was 
imprisoned because a key expert witness did not understand that the multiplication theorem 
of probabilities requires the events under consideration to be independent, and the court did 
not appreciate that the need to avoid the prosecutor’s fallacy requires weighing up the relative 
likelihood of the two competing explanations for the children’s deaths – although double 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) fatalities in the same family are very rare, double 
infant murder in the same context is rarer still. The original analysis put the likelihood of two 
deaths at 1:73 million; a Bayesian analysis puts the relative likelihood at the odds ratio for 
double SIDS against double homicide at between 4.5:1 and 9:1. But Bayesian reasoning is 
not allowed in an English court.
27
  
 
As these examples illustrate, there has never been a greater need for informed use of 
quantitative evidence and the widest possible appreciation of evidence and uncertainty. 
Addressing this issue requires a variety of approaches – as illustrated in the ‘quasi-popular’ 
books by Goldacre (2008, 2012), Silver (2012) and Blastland and Spiegelhalter (2013) – in 
which all levels of the educational system should play a role by ensuring a sufficiently 
numerate population who can appreciate and, where necessary, critique quantitatively-
phrased arguments. Our case is not just that geography degree programmes should play a part 
in that educational process through introductory courses in enumeration (Cloke et al., 
2004).
28
 Spatial science should be at the core of all such programmes, because it is so 
important, and will undoubtedly become even more so as Big Data increasingly come to 
                                                          
21
 See http://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check-with-polly-curtis/2012/mar/15/ofsted-chief-maths-
wrong (accessed 3 January 2014) 
22
 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/12/theresa-may-health-tourism-facts (accessed 3 
January 2014) 
23
 See http://niesr.ac.uk/blog/benefit-tourism-commission-gives-us-some-facts (accessed 3 January 2014) 
24
 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-25336254 (accessed 3 January 2014): on the validity of the PISA 
tests see http://www.theguardian.com/news/2013/dec/03/pisa-methodology-education-oecd-student-
performance (accessed 3 January 2014) and Murphy (2010). 
25
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iain_Duncan_Smith (accessed 3 January 2014) 
26
 See http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/07/duncan-smith-rejects-evidence-based-policy-i-believe-
be-true (accessed 3 January 2014) 
27
 See the articles on this and other cases in Significance 2(1) March 2005. 
28
 But no more. Cloke et al. (2004, 283) describe enumeration in human geography as ‘best seen as a form of 
thin description, capable of identifying certain characteristics and patterns of data, but incapable of describing or 
explicating the meaningful nature of life’. 
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dominate much public and private sector decision-making (particularly if those data are 
increasingly drawn from unrepresentative commercial sources with no reliable benchmarking 
provided by high quality census enumerations: see the essays in Walton-Roberts et al., 2014). 
Whilst it remains the case that geography is a relatively numerate discipline, in schools and, 
in fact, in Universities in the UK, a recent report to the Royal Geographical Society (with 
IBG) raised concerns about students simply not having the computational or more ‘advanced’ 
skills needed to undertake quantitative research (or to compete with those from other 
countries where the training is to a much higher level: Harris et al., 2013). The ESRC’s 
Benchmarking Review of Human Geography identifies similar concerns (ESRC, 2013).  
 
Geography matters. To quote Cloke et al. again ‘human life is shaped by “where it happens” 
and … “where it happens” is socially shaped’. Contemporary spatial science addresses that, 
through rigorous analyses across a wide range of subject matter – economic, social, political, 
and even cultural. It is much more than quantitative description; it is rigorous quantitative 
analysis of patterns, relationships and differences that can only be appreciated through the 
study of aggregates (albeit often bespoke aggregates created from individual – many of them 
geocoded – data) and which are not only important to understanding and accounting for the 
structuring of society but also in many cases highly relevant to policy development 
attempting to create a better, more equal and sustainable society. This is exemplified by a 
massive, ever-expanding volume of literature. As this response was being drafted several 
papers attracted our attention. One was a meta-analysis which demonstrated strong and 
consistent relationships between an individual student’s educational performance and the 
characteristics (such as family income) of her/his classroom peers (Johnson, 2013); another 
showed that the incidence of mental illnesses in an area was significantly linked to crime 
rates there (Dustmann and Fasani, 2014); Norman and Boyle (2014) extended earlier work 
(Dibben and Popham, 2013; Green, 2013) exploring links between migration, areas of 
varying degrees of socio-economic deprivation, and age-specific death rates (‘people live in 
different types of places at different stages in the life course’); and Rind et al. (2013) linked 
health inequalities within England to the geography of recent industrial decline. These, and 
many others, illustrate the structuration processes adumbrated by Cloke et al.: people make 
places and places make people. 
 
The issues discussed in those papers – educational performance, crime, illness – have 
important subjective elements and as such are worthy of study. But each individual 
experience can also be treated as an ‘objective’ fact, albeit with a degree of measurement 
error (a doctor misdiagnosing a cause of death, for example), combined with other similar 
observations and subject to aggregate statistical analysis. It is then possible to uncover 
whether certain events or characteristics are significantly clustered into particular places, and 
– if that is the case – begin asking why (a question that may be posed before the data 
collection begins, of course, if either previous studies or theoretical arguments suggest 
plausible reasons that should be tested using rigorous analytical procedures).
29
 Only then can 
ameliorative action – tackling the spread of an infectious disease, for example, or reducing 
differences in life expectancy – be considered. Evidence-based policy requires much more 
than thin description of ‘what things gather where’; it requires knowledge of why they are 
gathered there and the impacts of such clustering. Similar arguments can be made for 
evidence-based analyses of policy implementation – the efficacy of flood forecasting as a tool 
                                                          
29
 On the day when this manuscript was submitted to the editors, The Times (of London) carried an article 
entitled ‘Poor boys who will not live to retirement’ showing that within England life expectancy for babies born 
in 2014 varied from 67.8 in one place to 97.7 in another. (http://www.my-rss.co.uk/feeditem.php?feed=0&word 
=&search=&item=286837 – accessed 27 January 2014). 
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for ensuring that property-owners have viable insurance, for example; where people rely on 
food banks; and the impact of various changes in taxation systems (such as the ‘bedroom 
tax’/’spare room subsidy’ introduced in the UK in 2013: see Hamnett, 201330). Such 
evidence-based pre-policy and post-implementation analyses would hopefully ensure fewer 
government blunders of the frequency and magnitude described and analysed by King and 
Crewe (2013: see also Hall, 1980). 
 
Unfortunately, those arguments are not accepted by all geographers. The commentaries by 
Brunsdon  and O’Sullivan are from scholars already convinced by the case, which they have 
made stronger, whereas Wyly also appreciates the argument and points out some of the 
problems that those promoting the teaching of spatial science will (already do?) face given 
the ‘Big Data revolution’. But, sadly, there is only one contribution from among the 
substantial number of unconvinced geographers and who, we fear, illustrates the ‘mutual mis-
understanding, avoidance and mis-representation’31 that is all-too-common in contemporary 
human geography. Cresswell indicates that his attitude towards spatial science reflects the 
failure of teachers to enthuse him about it when he was an under- and post-graduate. Our 
original paper clearly similarly failed to stimulate him – and perhaps others too – to address 
that mis-understanding and avoidance. The dialogue must continue, however, because of the 
issue’s importance. 
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